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Abstract
The formal discipline theory claims that the study of mathematics develops 
individuals’ logical skills. Attridge and Inglis carried out an experiment in 
order to check whether or not that theory holds. Their conclusion was that 
their results showed that, while mathematics can indeed improve logical 
abilities, it is necessary to assume the defective interpretation of conditional. 
However, López-Astorga countered that other interpretations of their results 
are possible, that they do not prove that the material interpretation of 
conditional is not valid, and that the mental models theory can also explain 
them. In this paper, I comment the problems linked to the other possible 
interpretations proposed by López-Astorga and try to argue that the best 
option in the interpretation of Attridge and Inglis’ results is to assume the 
mental logic theory.
Keywords: defective conditional; formal discipline theory; material 
conditional; mental logic; mental models.
La teoría de la disciplina formal y la lógica mental
Resumen
La teoría de la disciplina formal sostiene que el estudio de las matemáticas 
desarrolla las habilidades lógicas de los individuos. Attridge e Inglis 
realizaron un experimento con el fin de comprobar si esta teoría es correcta 
o no. Su conclusión fue que sus resultados mostraban que, si bien las 
matemáticas pueden, efectivamente, mejorar las capacidades lógicas, es 
necesario asumir la interpretación defectuosa del condicional. Sin embargo, 
López-Astorga contraargumentó que eran posibles otras interpretaciones de 
sus resultados, que tales resultados no prueban que la interpretación material 
del condicional no es válida y que la teoría de los modelos mentales también 
los puede explicar. En este trabajo, comento los problemas vinculados a 
las otras interpretaciones posibles propuestas por López-Astorga y trato 
de mostrar que la mejor opción para la interpretación de los resultados de 
Attridge e Inglis es asumir la teoría de la lógica mental.
Palabras clave: condicional defectuoso; teoría de la disciplina formal; 
condicional material; lógica mental; modelos mentales.
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THE FORMAL DISCIPLINE THEORY AND MENTAL LOGIC1
Miguel López-Astorga
Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos “Juan Ignacio Molina” 
Universidad de Talca, Chile
Introduction
A theory attributed to the Greek philosopher Plato states that, if an 
individual studies mathematics, that individual will improve his (her) 
logical abilities. The theory is known as the formal discipline theory and it 
is obvious that it is an interesting and important theory to be considered by 
professionals and researchers in education field. In fact, several studies on 
this theory have been carried out. One of them, which is specially relevant, 
is that of Attridge and Inglis (2013). Their work offered suggesting results 
and their interpretation of them was, basically, that, although they showed 
that it is truth that mathematics learning develops logical abilities, they also 
demonstrated that the material interpretation of conditional does not hold 
and that the defective interpretation of it is a better alternative.
As it is well known, the material interpretation of conditional, 
which is attributed to another Greek philosopher, Philo of Megara, is the 
traditional interpretation that classical logic assumes. According to that, 
as it is also known, a conditional is only false when its antecedent is true 
and its consequent is false. Otherwise, it is true, even if, for example, the 
antecedent is false and the consequent is true. On the other hand, the defective 
1 This paper is a result of the Project N. I003011, “Algoritmos adaptativos e inferencias 
lógicas con enunciados condicionales”, supported by the Directorate for Research of the 
University of Talca (Dirección de Investigación de la Universidad de Talca), Chile. The 
author, who is also the main researcher of that Project, would like to thank the mentioned 
institutions for their help in funding this paper.
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interpretation comes from probability logic (e.g., Adams, 1998; Adams & 
Levine, 1975) and raises that, when the antecedent of a conditional is not 
true, the scenario described by that conditional is irrelevant. However, what 
is important here is that López-Astorga (2014a) responded to Attridge and 
Inglis’ (2013) paper and argued that their results could be interpreted in 
different ways. In particular, he proposed that those results do be compatible 
with Philo’s interpretation of conditional and that other theory, the mental 
models theory (from now on, MM) can account for them too.
Several points will be considered in this paper. On the one hand, I will 
comment the problems that the two alternative explanations indicated by 
López-Astorga (2014a) have. On the other hand, I will try to show that 
another cognitive theory, the mental logic theory (from now on, ML), can 
better explain Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) results. In this way, I will also 
argue that such results are clearly consistent with the predictions of ML 
and that this last theory can offer a very fruitful framework that can lead 
further researches in fields such as those of cognitive science, linguistics, 
psychology, philosophy, or education.
To do so, firstly, I will briefly explain what Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) 
research was exactly. Then I will describe the two alternative approaches 
proposed by López-Astorga (2014a), both that based on the material 
interpretation and that following MM, and indicate their difficulties. Finally, 
I will expose the general framework of ML and argue why Attridge and 
Inglis’ (2013) results are coherent with it and what such results really mean 
if interpreted from ML.
Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) experiment
Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) experiment refers to two basic rules of 
classical logic related to conditional coming from Stoic logic (in particular, 
they are attributed to Chrysippus of Soli), the Modus Ponens rule (from 
now on, mP) and the Modus Tollens rule (from now on, mT), and to two 
well known schemata that are considered to be fallacies in that logic, the 
affirming the consequent fallacy (from now on, aC) and the denying the 
antecedent fallacy (from now on, dA). The formal structure of those rules 
and fallacies are also well known:
mP: x → y, x / Ergo y
mT: x → y, ¬y / Ergo ¬x
aC: x → y, y / Ergo x
dA: x → y, ¬x / Ergo ¬y
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Where ‘→’ denotes conditional relationship, ‘¬’ stands for denial, and 
‘Ergo’ means that the right formula follows from the left formulae.
The aspect of Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) experiment relevant for the 
aims of this paper is that they used abstract tasks (with letters and numbers) 
corresponding to the previous four schemata. In those tasks, the left formulae 
appeared as premises and it was asked whether or not the conclusion, i.e., 
the right formula could be drawn form the premises. Participants had only 
the response options ‘yes’ and ‘no’.
According to Attridge and Inglis (2013), the mentioned tasks are 
interesting because they allow checking how participants interpret 
conditional. Attridge and Inglis (2013) take four possible interpretations into 
account, biconditional, material, defective, and conjunction, and link these 
four possible interpretations to the schemata indicated above. In their view, 
if an individual interprets conditional as biconditional, that individual must 
accept the four schemata. This is because, in standard logic, the following 
deduction are all correct:
x ↔ y, x / Ergo y
x ↔ y, ¬y / Ergo ¬x
x ↔ y, y / Ergo x
x ↔ y, ¬x / Ergo ¬y
Where ‘↔’ represents biconditional relationship [remember that, 
in classical logic, x ↔ y is equivalent to (x → y) · (y → x), where ‘·’ is 
conjunction].
However, if a material interpretation of conditional is made, the only 
valid schemata are mP and mT. As said, only those schemata are correct 
in classical logic, which assumes Philo’s interpretation. According to that 
logic, aC and dA are, as also indicated, fallacies.
On the other hand, if the interpretation is defective, only mP can 
be accepted. As also mentioned, the defective interpretation is linked to 
probability logic, and, in this last logic, only the situations in which the 
antecedent, i.e., x, is true are relevant (note that only in mP the second 
premise ensures that x is true).
Finally, if conditional is interpreted as conjunction, i.e., as x · y, only 
mP and aC can be admitted, since mP and aC are the only schemata in 
which both x and y are true (remember that a conjunction is true when its 
two conjuncts are true too).
Based on this, Attridge and Inglis (2013) presented tasks such as those 
indicated to English high school students. The part of their research that 
is relevant here is that students that completed a year of post-compulsory 
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mathematics made up a group of their participants. Such students executed 
the tasks on two occasions: before and after completing that year. Obviously, 
this fact limits the scope of my conclusions. As López-Astorga (2014a) also 
mentions, Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) results do not actually give information 
on Plato’s formal discipline theory. Such results can only lead to approximate 
conclusions on that theory, since, strictly speaking, they only enable to draw 
conclusions on a possible relation between the logical abilities improvement 
and the mentioned advanced level in mathematics in England.
Thus, taking into account that this limitation has an influence on Attridge 
and Inglis’ (2013) conclusions, López-Astorga’s (2014a) conclusions, and 
the conclusions that I will expose below, it can be said that the results 
obtained by Attridge and Inglis (2013) that are more interesting for this 
paper show that, before completing the mathematics post-compulsory level, 
participants tended to respond ‘yes’ in the four types of problems described 
above. However, after completing it, they considered only the conclusions 
of the mP tasks to be valid. Obviously, Attridge and Inglis (2013) interpreted 
this fact as evidence that, without learning mathematics, people understand 
conditional as biconditional and, after doing that, they adopt the defective 
interpretation.
Therefore, in their view, learning mathematics does improve logical 
abilities. Nevertheless, it does that in a way that is not compatible with the 
requirements of classical logic. If conditional is materially interpreted, 
it cannot be said that mathematics leads people to a better conditional 
reasoning. We can state that only if the defective interpretation is 
assumed.
Nonetheless, López-Astorga (2014a) thinks that Attridge and Inglis’ 
(2013) conclusions are questionable, since their results can be interpreted at 
least in two more different ways. His idea is not that the problems used by 
them are not good tasks to study logical reasoning. He acknowledges that 
those problems proved to be very useful in papers such as that of Evans, 
Clibbens, and Rood (1995). López-Astorga’s (2014a) criticism is only that 
Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) results do not show that what they claim. The 
two alternative explanations of them that he proposes and the difficulties 
that such explanations have are commented in the two next sections.
Philo’s interpretation and mathematical learning
One of the two alternative accounts raised by López-Astorga (2014a) is 
based on the idea that Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) results are really consistent 
with the material interpretation of conditional. His two main arguments 
seem to be the following:
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Firstly, the fact that participants answered ‘no’ in the mT problems 
after completing the post-compulsory level does not demonstrate that they 
considered all the scenarios in which appeared ¬p to be irrelevant. It is not 
possible to know what students actually thought. So, another possibility is 
that they did not accept the inferences with the form x → y, ¬y / Ergo ¬x 
because, in their view, cases of x could be possible.
Undoubtedly, this is a problem for the material interpretation, since, if 
this interpretation is assumed, the mT inferences must be accepted. However, 
López-Astorga’s (2014a) second argument, which is based on the literature 
on cognitive science and, in particular, in papers such as that of Byrne and 
Johnson-Laird (2009) and that of López-Astorga (2013a), is that mT is a lot 
harder than mP. Thus, the thesis is that Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) participants 
responded ‘no’ in the mT tasks because, given that mT is more difficult than 
mP, they did not apply mT and thought that, in a scenario in which both x 
→ y and ¬y are true, x can be both true and false.
Indeed, in classical logic, which, as said, adopts the material 
interpretation of conditional, the reason why mT is harder to use that mP is 
obvious. As it is well known, in systems such as that of Gentzen (1934), mP 
is a basic rule, but mT is not. As also explained by López-Astorga (2014a) 
and, of course, by Byrne and Johnson-Laird (2009) and by López-Astorga 
(2013a), deriving ¬x from x → y and ¬y requires a number of steps. Firstly, 
x has to be supposed. Secondly, mP has to be applied in order to draw y 
from x → y and x. Thirdly, the conjunction introduction rule (x, y / Ergo 
x · y) has to be used in order to deduce y · ¬y from y and ¬y. Fourthly, 
the Reductio ad Absurdum rule [x (supposition), y · ¬y / Ergo ¬x] has also 
to be considered in order to obtain ¬x from the initial supposition and the 
conjunction obtained in the third step. Therefore, while mP needs only one 
step, mT needs four steps. 
It is evident that these arguments can explain why Attridge and Inglis’ 
(2013) participants that completed the advanced mathematics level did not 
accept the inferences with the mT form. Nevertheless, this explanation has 
an important difficulty. It appears to claim that human mind follows the 
rules and the requirements of standard logic and, at present, there are no 
theories that hold the idea that human beings reason in accordance with such 
rules and requirements. There are theories, such as ML, which state that 
human reasoning is syntactic and that is leaded by logical rules. However, in 
general, those theories do not accept the idea that human thought uses all the 
formal rules of classical logic. For example, people do not often admit the 
disjunction introduction rule (x / ergo x v y, where ‘v’ denotes disjunction) 
and the conditional introduction rule {[x (supposed) / Ergo y] / Ergo x →y} 
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is also problematic (see, e.g., Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012). In fact, as 
commented below, ML does not admit the disjunction introduction rule as 
a ‘Core Schema’ and proposes restrictions for the conditional introduction 
rule. In this way, this is a point that this alternative explanation given by 
López-Astorga (2014a) needs to clarify.
MM and its view of conditional
Many papers and works describe and explain the general theses of MM 
(e.g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009; Johnson-Laird, 2010, 2012; Khemlani, 
Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 2012, 2014; Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012). This 
is a semantic theory that claims that reasoning is made by taking possibilities 
into account. Propositions refer to possibilities and, when they are faced with 
inferences, people only consider the possibilities that are consistent with each 
other in order to check or draw a conclusion. MM indicates the possibilities 
corresponding to each of classical logical operators (conjunction, disjunction, 
conditional, and biconditional). Nonetheless, for obvious reasons, only the 
possibilities related to conditional and biconditional are relevant here.
To describe which those possibilities are, firstly, it is necessary to 
mention that all the possibilities are not easy to be identified. Thus, MM 
distinguishes between ‘mental models’, i.e., possibilities that individuals 
detect without difficulties, and ‘fully explicit models’, i.e., possibilities 
that need certain cognitive effort to be identified. As far as conditional is 
concerned, a proposition such as x → y only has a mental model:
 x  y
This model represents a scenario in which both x and y happen. 
However, the fully explicit models of conditional are three:
 x  y
 ¬x  y
 ¬x  ¬y
So, the only scenario that conditional does not enable is that in which 
x is true and y is false.
This distinction of MM allows explaining many cognitive phenomena, 
including the fact that mP is easier than mT. mP can be applied by considering 
only the mental model of the conditional premise. Indeed, that premise, 
which is the first premise, presents, as said, a scenario in which both x and 
y are true. The second premise states that x is true, but, if the first premise 
is taken into account, if x is true, it is only possible that y is true as well. 
The case of mT, on the other hand, is different. To use mT it is necessary 
to identify the fully explicit models, since only the third one reveals us that 
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the only possibility when ¬y is true is that ¬x is also true. Furthermore, 
another important datum is that, while the mental model of biconditional 
is the same as that of conditional, the fully explicit models of biconditional 
are only these ones:
 x y
 ¬x ¬y
Based on this, MM can easily account for most participants’ response 
before taking the post-compulsory year of mathematics in Attridge and Inglis’ 
(2013) experiment. They interpreted the first premise, i.e., the conditional 
premise, as a biconditional. Thus, mP was accepted because x is only true 
in the first fully explicit model of biconditional and, in that model, y is also 
true. Secondly, aC was admitted because y is only true in that same model 
and, in it, x is true too. On the other hand, mT was accepted because y is 
only false in the second fully explicit model of biconditional and, in that 
model, x is false as well. Finally, dA was admitted because x is also only 
false in this last fully explicit model and, in it, y is false too.
The problem for MM is to explain what happens after students complete 
the post-compulsory level. As said, after that, they only consider mP to be 
correct, but, as López-Astorga (2014a) indicates, Attridge and Inglis (2013) 
seem to argue that MM cannot account for that result. From the framework 
of MM, the only possibility could be to assume that participants, in that 
case, only detected the mental model, whether or not the first premise was 
interpreted as a biconditional. However, this possibility does not enable 
to explain the fact that students only accepted mP, since, if they took the 
mental model into account, aC should also have been accepted (remember 
that the mental model refers to a scenario in which both the antecedent and 
the consequent are true). Strictly speaking, an individual would accept only 
mP if he (or she) identified both the first and the second fully explicit models 
and did not detect the third fully explicit model. In this way, the second fully 
explicit model (i.e., the scenario in which x is false and y is true) would 
reveal that the fact that y is true does not involve that x is true too (so aC 
could not be accepted), and that the fact that x is false does involve that y 
is false as well (so dA could not be accepted). At the same time, given that 
the third fully explicit model is not detected, mT could not be considered to 
be valid, since the individual would not know what happens when y is false.
This is a problem for MM because the theory, in principle, only allows 
situations in which the mental model or the fully explicit models are 
identified, but not intermediate situations. To solve this problem, López-
Astorga (2014a) proposes an interpretation of MM claiming that individuals 
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have several options about models and that to detect the mental model or 
the fully explicit models of conditionals (or biconditionals) are not the only 
possibilities. In my view, this idea is consistent with the general theses 
of MM, since this theory has another important concept: the concept of 
modulation. According to it, sometimes meanings, contexts, and pragmatic 
factors can block certain models. Thus, it could be said that López-Astorga’s 
(2014a) interpretation leads one to think that, while mathematical learning 
caused students to improve their logical reasoning in a sense (they did not 
interpret conditionals as biconditionals anymore), that improvement was 
limited, because they could not identify all the fully explicit models of 
conditionals included in Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) experiment.
It is obvious that this interpretation is interesting, but it has some 
difficulties too. Firstly, in my view, it is necessary to pay attention to a 
general problem that MM needs to solve. It is unclear when individuals 
identify mental models and when they detect more models. It is important 
that MM clarifies under what circumstances it is only possible consider 
mental models and under what circumstances it is also possible to take other 
possibilities into account. Maybe it would be an exaggeration to require MM 
to describe an algorithm or a mental mechanism revealing the situations in 
which more cognitive effort is usually made and other models (and not only 
mental models) are available. Nevertheless, further explanations in this way 
are needed, since the exact reasons why a same group of participants can 
detect different numbers of models in different experimental conditions are 
in a sense unknown. On the other hand, there is also a difficulty specially 
related to Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) results. The tasks used by them included 
abstract propositions with letters and numbers. In this way, it is hard to 
understand how modulation could lead the participants that completed the 
advanced level to accept the two first fully explicit models of conditional 
and to reject the third one. One might think that pragmatics, contexts, and 
meanings cannot play a relevant role in situations in which the propositions 
are very abstract. Therefore, this is another point that MM must account for.
So, both of the alternative explanations offered by López-Astorga 
(2014a) have problems. Nonetheless, ML can give an account without 
difficulties and, for this reason, it can be thought that it is the alternative 
approach that is more consistent with Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) results. 
This idea is argued in the next section.
ML and the sophistication levels
As said, ML (e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998a; O’Brien, 2009, 2014; 
O’Brien & Li, 2013; O’Brien & Manfrinati, 2010) is a syntactic theory 
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and assumes the idea that there is a logic that is followed by human mind. 
However, that logic is not standard propositional calculus. According to 
ML, human reasoning works by means of formal rules and those rules are 
valid in classical logic. Nevertheless, the theory does not admit all the rules 
of standard calculus or systems such as that of Gentzen (1934). As also 
mentioned, ML claims that the basic rules of reasoning are a number of 
schemata in which problematic rules such as that of disjunction introduction 
are not included and rules such as that of conditional introduction have 
certain restrictions. In particular, it distinguishes different kinds of rules. 
There are ‘Core Schemata’, which are rules with a greatest use, and ‘Feeder 
Schemata’, which are rules that are applied only if their use in turn allows 
using Core Schemata. There are also ‘Incompatibility Schemata’, which 
refer to contradictions, and other schemata. Nonetheless, what is important 
for this paper is that the theory also includes a ‘Direct Reasoning Routine’ 
that indicates the order and the way the schemata are used and that mT is 
not a basic schema in it.
Thus, ML can explain why mP is easier than mT as well. The first one 
is a Core Schema (in particular, it is Schema 7 in Braine & O’Brien, 1998b), 
but the second one, as said, is not a basic rule. This does not mean that mT 
is impossible for human beings. According to ML, mT requires certain 
reasoning strategies, including Reductio ad Absurdum, which, while they 
are possible for sophisticated individuals, they are not absolutely and easily 
available for all human beings.
This distinction between individuals that are more and less sophisticated 
made by ML is very relevant for the aims of this paper, since it is linked 
to the use of mT. As explained by Braine and O’Brien (1998c), a curious 
phenomenon regarding mT can be observed. Children often seem to respond 
better than adults to tasks in which mT is involved (to support this fact, Braine 
& O’Brien quote works such as, for example, O’Brien & Overton, 1982; 
O’Brien & Shapiro, 1968; or Rumain, Connell, & Braine, 1983). However, 
this is only an apparent better performance. What actually happens is that 
both children and unsophisticated adults tend to accept invited inferences 
(Geis & Zwicky, 1971), which in turn lead to give the correct answers in 
the mT problems. Indeed, the invited inferences cause conditional to be 
understood as biconditional and, while it is very hard to draw ¬x from x 
→ y and ¬y, it is very easy to do so from x ↔ y and ¬y. In this way, the 
idea is that unsophisticated individuals, including children, tend to interpret 
conditional as biconditional, and that, when individuals become more 
sophisticated, that trend disappears.
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The problem is that the fact that the trend disappears does not involve 
that individuals acquire the logical abilities needed to use reasoning strategies 
such as that related to Reductio ad Absurdum. So, there is an intermediate 
sophistication level in which individuals do not interpret conditional as 
biconditional and, therefore, do not make fallacies such as aC and Da. 
Nevertheless, given that their logical skills are not developed enough, they 
cannot use the Reductio ad Absurdum strategy and hence solve problems 
involving mT. They only execute correctly tasks linked to mP. Thus, only 
the most sophisticated individuals –that is, those that do not consider 
conditionals to be biconditionals and, in addition, can make inferences 
that require the Reductio ad Absurdum strategy- offer the logically correct 
answers in tasks referring to mP, mT, aC, and Da.
As it can be easily noted, this framework enables to interpret Attridge 
and Inglis’ (2013) results without difficulties and it is absolutely coherent 
with them. It can be stated that, before completing the mathematics 
advanced level, most students participating in Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) 
experiment are not sophisticated in logic. For this reason, they understand the 
conditionals included in the reasoning tasks as biconditonals and, therefore, 
consider mP, mT, aC, and Da to be valid inferences. After taking mathematics 
post-compulsory level, they reach a logical reasoning level that can be 
considered to be intermediate. In this level, they note that conditionals are 
not biconditionals. Although, undoubtedly, this is an important improvement, 
the level achieved is not the best possible level. Students do not have the 
necessary strategies to solve problems in which Reductio ad Absurdum is 
involved yet. Such strategies correspond to the most sophisticated level, and 
it seems that mathematics post-compulsory level in England does not help 
achieve this last logical level.
In any case, what is most relevant here is that the results obtained by 
Attridge and Inglis (2013) not only are consistent with the general theses of 
ML. It can also be said that ML predicts such results and can hence offer a 
clear account of what happens to students’ logical abilities after completing 
the mathematics advanced level in England. In addition, the explanation of 
ML does not have the problems that can be found in the account based on 
Philo’s interpretation of conditional or in that of MM.
Conclusions
A general problem in cognitive science is that the same experimental 
results can be explained from different approaches, systems, or frameworks 
(see, e.g., besides López-Astorga, 2014a, López-Astorga, 2013a, 2013b, 
2014b, 2014c). However, the previous arguments show that, in the case of 
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the particular problem analyzed in this paper, ML is the theory that can give 
the best explanation.
As commented, an account based on the material interpretation of 
conditional must solve the problems that the idea that human reasoning is 
leaded by classical logic causes, since it is obvious that people not always use 
all the formal rules of standard propositional calculus. On the other hand, an 
explanation from MM has also to address certain problems, because this theory 
needs to clarify when individuals can only identify mental models and when 
they can detect other semantic possibilities. It is true that MM proposes the 
concept of modulation, but it is absolutely necessary to explain how modulation 
works in abstract scenarios such as those used by Attridge and Inglis (2013). 
As far as the defective interpretation assumed by Attridge and Inglis 
(2013) is concerned, it is clear that, in principle, it seems coherent with their 
results. Maybe this is not surprising, since the defective interpretation and 
ML share relevant theses, including the rejection of Philo’s interpretation and 
the idea that it is very hard to suppose that people, when they reason about 
conditionals, consider situations in which the antecedent is false and the 
consequent is true. However, I think that the ML framework provides a much 
more detailed explanation. As shown, it can account for and predict all the 
results commented in this paper (both those obtained before completing the 
mathematics advanced level and those obtained after that). So, in my view, 
the explanation given by ML appears to be more finished because, in addition 
to describing the exact characteristics regarding logical reasoning that can 
be attributed to participants according to their responses in the tasks, it also 
predicts, based on the literature, not only that the intermediate individuals 
will only accept the mP inferences, but also that the unsophisticated 
individuals will interpret conditionals as biconditionals. This last fact is a 
result that Attridge and Inglis (2013) found as well, and, as I understand 
it, it demonstrates a posteriori that the general approach of ML is correct.
Obviously, the previous arguments are relevant in the cognitive science 
field, since ML has been often misunderstood and misinterpreted. In 
particular, the most frequent mistake has been to think that it is equivalent or 
very akin to classical logic or standard propositional calculus. Nevertheless, 
form my point of view, the arguments are also very important for other 
scientific fields. ML opens many explicative possibilities for topics such 
as that of information processing or that of propositions understanding. 
Likewise, it can be a useful instrument in fields such as philosophy or 
linguistics, and, of course, education. The ML approach can help detect the 
contents or the methodologies that can develop logical reasoning abilities, 
to what extent certain courses provide that development, and the particular 
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subject areas that should be studied in the schools in order to achieve logical 
sophistication in students. 
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